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DEDICATION 
 
To all those who have ever felt like giving up… 
      Don’t succumb. 
      You are capable of more than you know.   
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ABSTRACT 
 
 The use of monetary sanctions as part of the punishment process has been a part of 
the American criminal justice system since colonization. However, there has been little 
empirical research investigating the effect of financial penalties incurred by criminal 
offenders and the extent to which such sanctions relate to the likelihood of recidivism. By 
applying General Strain Theory, this study explores how monetary sanctions, along with 
demographics and prior offense type, affect the recidivism rates of persons who were 
incarcerated. Utilizing a sample of 729 first-time prisoners released from Iowa prisons and 
then followed for three years, secondary data from the Iowa Department of Corrections is 
paired with self-collected monetary sanction data from Iowa Courts Online to test the 
hypothesis that court-ordered monetary sanctions affect the recidivism of first-time prisoners 
in Iowa. Logistic regression analyses suggest there is not a statistically significant association 
between monetary sanctions and recidivism. However, ROC curve analysis suggests there is 
an association between monetary sanctions and recidivism. The results also suggest higher 
total sanction amount decreases time to recidivism, while higher restitution amount increases 
time to recidivism. 
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Since the 1970’s, the United States correctional system population has 
dramatically increased. Today there are more than seven million people incarcerated, on 
parole or probation, or under some other form of state supervision (Gottschalk 2011). In 
1994, 272,111 released prisoners from fifteen states were tracked for 3 years after their 
release. Within those three years, 67.5 percent of the released prisoners were rearrested 
(Langan and Levin 2002). More recently in 2005, the United States Department of 
Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics studied the recidivism rates of thirty states, including 
Iowa. They found that 67.8 percent of prisoners released were arrested within three years 
(Durose, Cooper, and Snyder 2014).  
Per the National Institute of Justice, recidivism is measured by criminal acts that 
result in re-arrest, reconviction, or return to prison with or without a new sentence during 
a three-year period following the prisoner’s release (National Institute of Justice 2014). 
For purposes of this study, labeling an individual a recidivist involves a measure of 
‘return to prison’ during a three-year period following release. By observing this 
measure, one study found 49.7 percent of prisoners return to prison within three years, 
due to either a technical violation or a new conviction (Durose et al. 2014). An alternative 
study found 67.5 percent of prisoners returned to prison within three years of release due 
to a technical violation or a new conviction (Langan and Levin 2002). These statistics 
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support the notion that a significant portion of offenders released from prison go on to 
commit additional crimes, which is a concern of the criminal justice system. 
 In Iowa, 96 percent of inmates will leave prison (Iowa Department of Corrections 
n.d.). Recidivism rates in Iowa are nationally low. In December 2016, the return to prison 
rate was 34.2 percent (Iowa Department of Corrections 2017). Relevant to the present 
study’s period, the 2015 fiscal year saw a 31.9 percent return to prison recidivism rate 
(Iowa Department of Corrections 2016). However, while recidivism rates in Iowa are 
relatively low, repeat offending is still a problem undermining the retributive and 
deterrent foundations of the criminal justice system and shows that rehabilitation, another 
cornerstone of the criminal justice system, is failing. This problem begs the question: 
What can be done to prevent offenders from recidivating? 
Many responses have included eliminating harsh mandatory-length sentencing 
laws, making full employment a domestic policy goal and providing incentives to 
employers who hire offenders, establishing prison education programs and incentivizing 
inmate participation, supporting community policing efforts, and increasing community 
funding in high prison population communities. But, little scholarly attention has been 
given to the impact of increasing amounts of monetary sanctions imposed on recidivism.  
The monetary sanction variable in Iowa includes costs, fines, restitution, and 
surcharges that are imposed by the courts and other criminal justice agencies on persons 
accused and/or convicted of crimes. Each monetary sanction has a unique purpose. Costs 
are payments to reimburse the state and local jurisdictions for the costs of the criminal 
justice procedure. Fines are monetary penalties which can be either mandatory or by the 
discretion of the judge and are imposed to act as punishment for committing a specific 
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crime. Restitution is a court-ordered payment some offenders must pay to their victim(s) 
to compensate them for their loss and/or injury. Lastly, surcharges are add-on amounts 
implemented to generate revenue for goals not necessarily related to the criminal justice 
procedure.  
The principal argument made by the criminal justice system is that court-ordered 
monetary sanctions act as rehabilitation, retribution, and a deterrent to prevent recidivism 
(Hillsman and Green 1992; Atkinson 2015). However, apart from restitution, the research 
conducted on this topic indicates differently. Researchers are concluding that costs, fines, 
and surcharges do not act as rehabilitation, retribution, or a deterrent, but instead solely 
contribute to an ever-growing amount of legal debt.  
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this thesis is to test the basic premise of general strain theory as 
contextualized by Agnew (1992) that strains or stressors increase the likelihood of 
negative emotions like anger and frustration. These emotions then create pressure for 
corrective action, and crime is one possible response. This study explores how court-
ordered monetary sanctions, along with demographics and initial prison conviction 
charge, affect the recidivism rates of persons who were incarcerated. This thesis utilizes a 
dataset consisting of 729 first-time prisoners released from Iowa prisons between July 1, 
2011 and June 30, 2012 who were then followed until the 2015 fiscal year. The data for 
this study was obtained through the Iowa Department of Corrections and Iowa Courts 
Online and has been approved by the Iowa State University Institutional Review Board. 
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Previous theorizing and research on monetary sanctions focuses on debtor’s 
prisons, frequency and magnitude of legal debt, how legal debt contributes to the 
accumulation of the disadvantaged, how legal debt increases the likelihood of ongoing 
criminal activity/charts a path back to prison, the impact of socio-cultural factors on 
monetary sanction imposition, whether recidivism is more likely with fines or community 
service, and if offenders view monetary sanctions as an effective form of punishment. 
Thorough analysis of previous research has identified a gap in the literature. While 
scholars have acknowledged that monetary sanctions may lead to recidivism and that 
paying restitution may lead to a decrease in recidivism, I am unaware of any study 
directly comparing the amount of legal debt to recidivism rate. This study is an attempt to 
bridge that gap. 
 This study adds to the growing body of knowledge that exists regarding the 
recidivism of criminal offenders and supports future research related to court-ordered 
monetary sanctions. This study helps identify areas of concern that need to be addressed 
when an offender is sentenced for a crime and throughout the collection process. It aims 
to aid in the prevention of future criminal behavior and recidivism, while supporting the 
restorative justice philosophy. Because this study analyzes and explains recidivism 
beyond what is known to affect the phenomenon, this study is useful to legislators, all 
personnel in the criminal justice system, scholars, and to the community. 
This research is separated into several chapters. Chapter two discusses the 
literature that exists about the criminal justice system, recidivism, monetary sanctions, 
and general strain theory. This chapter will look specifically at the punishment 
philosophies: incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and restoration; 
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recidivism and factors that influence the phenomenon: demographics, criminal history, 
the LSI-R, and socioeconomic status; court-ordered monetary sanctions, offenders’ 
ability to pay, and the collection process; and lastly, court-ordered monetary sanctions 
and decision-making are discussed within a general strain theoretical framework. Chapter 
three discusses the research design and methodology of this project. This chapter presents 
the research hypotheses, discusses the data set, and presents the research design and 
analytical plan. Chapter four presents the results. Chapter five presents a discussion of the 
results presented in chapter four. Finally, Chapter six discusses limitations of the 
research, provides suggestions for future research, and presents a conclusion.  
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CHAPTER II 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Chapter two is a presentation of the literature that exists on a variety of aspects of 
the American criminal justice system. The information presented in this chapter is 
particularly oriented towards topics of punishment philosophies, recidivism, court-
ordered monetary sanctions, and general strain theory. The five punishment philosophies 
are discussed: rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and restoration. The 
topic of recidivism is discussed in relation to previous studies of recidivism and factors 
that influence the phenomenon: demographics, criminal history, the LSI-R, and 
socioeconomic status. Court-ordered monetary sanctions are discussed in relation to their 
structure in Iowa, offenders’ ability to pay, and the collection process. Finally, general 
strain theory is examined in relation to court-ordered monetary sanctions, poverty, and 
decision-making. Previous studies on court-ordered monetary sanctions are dispersed 
throughout. 
 
The Criminal Justice System 
 The United States has the world’s highest incarceration rate and locks up more 
people than any other country. At least in theory, penal policies are aimed at 
incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and restoration. Support for these 
different philosophies of crime prevention in the criminal justice system has changed 
dramatically in the past forty years.  
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Initially, the criminal justice system’s main punishment philosophy was 
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation aims at restoring an offender to being a productive, law-
abiding citizen in society.  In the 1970s, the strong emphasis towards rehabilitation gave 
way to an increased focus on incapacitation, deterrence, and a “tough on crime” mindset. 
Incapacitation refers to the use of confinement to prevent an offender from further 
victimizing members of society. Today, incapacitation is still the primary justification for 
imprisonment (Zimring and Hawkins 1995) and the new penology, a set of criminal 
justice policies that focus on risk management and control of groups of offenders rather 
than helping them, is flooding the system.  
Three other punishment philosophies exist: retribution, deterrence, and 
restoration. Imprisonment, a method of incapacitation, is also the most common method 
of retribution, which is the payment of debt to society to amend for one’s crimes. 
Retribution firmly seeks to match the severity of the punishment to the severity of the 
criminal offense. Court-ordered monetary sanctions are one of many forms of retribution. 
In theory, the more severe the criminal offense, the more expensive the court-ordered fine 
will be.  
On the opposite side of the punishment spectrum lies deterrence. Deterrence aims 
to discourage crime by using threats of severe punishment. If the correctional system is 
tough enough, people will be dissuaded from a lifestyle of crime for fear of the 
punishment. In theory, if court-ordered monetary sanction amounts are high enough, 
individuals will not commit crime in fear of being sentenced with large amounts of debt. 
However, because members of the disadvantaged strata who are burdened by strong 
social pressures commit most crimes (Rusche and Dinwiddie 1978), it is difficult to 
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create a humane deterrent. This is because the standard of living within prisons must 
appear even worse than the strata’s present living conditions. This is difficult because, as 
stated by Rusche and Dinwiddie (1978:4): 
When we get down to the poorest and most oppressed of our population we find 
the condition of their life so wretched that it would be impossible to conduct a 
prison humanely without making the lot of the criminal more eligible than that of 
many free citizens.  
Per Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939:176), “We can safely conclude, therefore, that the 
application of fines has its natural limits in the material conditions of the lower strata of 
the population.” Critelli and Crawford (1980) suggested monetary sanctions are not a 
useful deterrent because offenders view monetary sanctions as an incidental, indirect 
form of punishment (DeLisi and Conis 2013). 
The newest punishment philosophy is restoration. It emphasizes repairing the 
harm caused by crime. It is accomplished through mediation-style processes involving 
offenders, victims, and community residents. Restitution is one example of restorative 
justice and is theorized to restore the victim and offender, lowering the recidivism rate 
(Ervin and Schneider 1990; Ruback 2002). 
 
Recidivism 
 Recidivism is one of the most fundamental concepts in criminal justice and refers 
to a person’s relapse into criminal behavior, often after the person undergoes punishment 
for a previous crime. Beck and Shipley (1989:2) define recidivism as, “estimates of the 
percentages of released prisoners who commit another offense.” Various measures of 
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recidivism and length of follow-up period provide different estimates of the recidivism 
rate. In Iowa, the most common measure includes individuals who have returned to 
prison within three years of release. This measure provides a recidivism rate of 31.9 
percent in the 2015 fiscal year, which describes the recidivism for offenders leaving 
prison in the 2012 fiscal (Iowa Department of Corrections 2016). A vigilant review of the 
literature on recidivism indicates that the same risk factors predict most types of criminal 
recidivism when released from prison. These high-risk variables include demographics, 
criminal history, LSI-R score, and socioeconomic status. Discussion of the variables 
pertinent to this study follows. 
 
Demographics  
The United States is home to one of the most racially and ethnically diverse 
populations on the planet. As a result, differences in the distribution of crime are affected 
by demographic characteristics, especially age, sex, and race. Demographic 
characteristics not only factor in the risk of committing crime initially, but they also play 
a significant part in an offender’s risk of recidivism. 
Recidivism has an inverse relationship with age. May, Sharma, and Stewart 
(2008:4) found “the reoffending rate was highest (70%) for those aged from 18 to 20, and 
lowest (36%) for those aged 40 and over.” This relationship indicates that recidivism 
decreases as age increases. Langan and Levin (2002) concluded that on average, 
offenders in younger age groups when released from prison have higher recidivism rates. 
In Iowa, the 2015 fiscal year saw a concurring pattern with recidivism decreasing as age 
increased (Iowa Department of Corrections 2016).  
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There is a great disparity in criminal behavior and the incarcerated population 
between genders. Women recidivate at a lower rate than men. Langan and Levin (2002) 
agree that males are more likely to recidivate than females, concluding males return to 
prison at a rate of 53 percent compared to females at 39.4 percent. According to the Iowa 
Department of Corrections (2016), the 2015 fiscal year saw higher rates of recidivism for 
males (32.4%) than for females (27.8%). 
Recent attention has been devoted to the racial composition of the United States’ 
prison population, particularly with the publication of Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim 
Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. In her book, Alexander (2016:2) 
argues, “We have not ended racial caste in America; we have merely redesigned it.” 
Blumestein (1982:1259) stated, “one of the most distressing and troublesome aspects of 
the operation of the criminal justice system in the United States is the severe 
disproportionality between blacks and whites in the composition of the prison 
populations.” Research has also been devoted to analyzing the racial disparities in 
recidivism rates. Langan and Levin (2002) found blacks recidivated at a 54.2 percent rate 
and whites recidivated at a 49.9 percent rate. In the past, Iowa saw a large disparity in the 
recidivism rates between white and black offenders, black offenders recidivating at much 
higher rates. However, in the past four years, the recidivism rates for black offenders 
have declined. The 2015 fiscal year found blacks recidivated at a 32.4 percent rate and 
whites recidivated at a 32.3 percent rate (Iowa Department of Corrections 2016).                                 
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Criminal history 
 Most first-time prisoners released from prison are already recidivists, defined as 
having been convicted of crimes previously and undergoing sanctions or treatment 
programs to prevent future crime. Having an established criminal history labels an 
offender a repeat offender and increases their individual risk for future criminal activity. 
According to May et al. (2008:4), “the likelihood of reoffending increases with the 
number of previous convictions.”  
Recidivism rates also differ on the criminal history offense type. Durose et al. 
(2014) found the highest rates of recidivism among property offenders (36.4% after one 
year; 61.8% after five years), followed by drug offenders (28.1% after one year; 53.3% 
after five years). During Iowa’s 2015 fiscal year, offenders released from prison on drug 
offenses were most likely to recidivate, closely followed by property offenders (Iowa 
Department of Corrections 2016).                             
 
The Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) score 
 The LSI-R is an accurate and respected risk/need assessment tool, which 
identifies problem areas in an offender’s life and predicts his/her risk of recidivism. It 
consists of 54 questions ranging across ten domains known to be related to an offender’s 
likelihood of returning to prison. It assesses risk based on factors such as antisociality, 
drug history, employment, recreational and leisure activities, family, and antisocial peers. 
As shown in Table 1, LSI-R scores can range from 0-54. On average, males score 25 and 
females score 26 (Rhode Island Department of Corrections 2011).  
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Table 1: LSI-R Risk/Need Scoring 
 
 
 
 
The LSI-R has been indicated as the most useful actuarial measure of adult 
offender recidivism (Gendreau, Goggin, and Smith 2002; Gendreau, Little, and Goggin 
1996). Wooditch, Tang, and Taxman (2014) concluded those individuals who increased 
in total LSI-R score were more likely to be reconvicted of an offense than those who 
decreased in their total LSI-R scores. A study conducted on Iowa probation and parole 
data concurred that the LSI-R is significantly related to predicting future criminal activity 
(Prell 2006). Because a small number of offenders repeatedly commit crimes, it can be 
concluded that these offenders have high LSI-R scores. Therefore, emphasizing the 
importance of risk assessment and having an accurate tool (Einat 2008).  
 
Socioeconomic status 
Poverty is defined as, “the gap between one’s needs and the resources available to 
fulfill them” (Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, and Zhao 2013:976). The average family size 
in 2012 was 2.55 people (Statista 2016). The poverty level in January 2012 was $11,170 
for a one-person household, $15,130 for a two-person household, and $19,090 for a 
three-person household (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 2012). For each 
additional household member, the poverty level continues to increase by approximately 
$4,000.  
Risk/Need Level LSI-R Score 
High 40-54 
Moderate High 33-39 
Moderate 26-32 
Low Moderate 19-25 
Low 0-18 
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Criminal defendants are overwhelmingly poor. In 2014, prior to incarceration, 
incarcerated people had a median annual income of $19,185, which was 41 percent lower 
than non-incarcerated people of similar ages (Rabuy and Kopf 2015). The stigma 
regarding poverty seems to revolve around minority races, but this fact can be said for all 
offenders regardless of gender, race, and ethnicity group. Research conducted by Western 
(2006) indicates that formerly incarcerated individuals earn even lower incomes after 
release. For example, white men, on average, earned $11,140 annually, Hispanic men, on 
average, earned $10,432 annually, and black men, on average, earned $8,012 annually 
(Wester 2006; Beckett and Harris 2011). 
To further drive home this point, eighty to ninety percent of defendants in the 
criminal justice system qualify for court-appointed legal counsel (Beckett and Harris 
2011; Zimmer 2013). Being approved for court-appointed legal counsel is based on an 
individual having an economic status as indigent. Iowa Code, Chapter 815, Section 9 
states: 
A person is entitled to an attorney appointed by the court to represent the person if 
the person has an income level at or below one hundred twenty-five percent of the 
United States poverty level… In making the determination of a person’s ability to 
pay for the cost of an attorney, the court shall consider not only the person’s 
income, but also the availability of any assets subject to execution. 
The problem gets worse. Gottschalk (2011) observed that some indigent defendants 
waive their right to counsel to avoid going further into debt by repaying the cost of court-
appointed legal counsel.  
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Socioeconomic status certainly plays a role in an offender’s day-to-day life, as 
well as what legal representation can be afforded, but what impact does socioeconomic 
status have on recidivism? The verdict is still out. According to Andrews and Bonta 
(1994:184), “no single variable has been more important in criminological theorizing 
than social class.” Research prior to 1950 found large relationships between class and 
criminality. Today, a relationship still exists between class and criminality, but the 
relationships is slowly diminishing. Tittle and Meier (1990; 1991) showed socioeconomic 
status to be a very weak predictor of juvenile delinquency. Gendreau et al. (1996) also 
studied socioeconomic status and found that compared to other predictors used in their 
study, SES was found to be less robust, but still a predictor of recidivism. 
 
Court-Ordered Monetary Sanctions 
 Recidivism is not a new concept in research, however little scholarly attention and 
menial amounts of empirical research have been devoted to the impact of increasing 
amounts of monetary sanctions on recidivism. What little has been done documents that 
burdensome criminal justice monetary sanctions, at times excluding restitution, tend to 
spawn recidivism (Zimmer 2013).  
 In the literature, court-ordered monetary sanctions are called several different 
names including economic sanctions, financial obligations, and legal financial obligations 
(Ruback 2011). Fines, along with death, are plausibly the oldest forms of criminal 
punishment. Historically, the institution of monetary sanctions as criminal punishment 
dates back to ancient civilizations namely the Greeks, Romans, ancient Near Easterners, 
and Germanic tribes (DeLisi and Conis 2013; Atkinson 2015). Fines as criminal 
15 
 
punishment served two expressed purposes during ancient times: restitution to the victim 
and a tax for the public good (DeLisi and Conis 2013). These antique purposes still ring 
true today. Presently, criminal punishment utilizing monetary payment can be found in 
many countries around the world including the United States, Australia, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany. 
Court-ordered monetary sanctions have been a component of criminal sentencing 
in the United States since the arrival of the European settlers. In colonial America, 
settlers detested the debtor’s prisons in England and abandoned monetary sanctions for 
most serious crimes (Atkinson 2015). Throughout the northern states, monetary sanctions 
were implemented as punishment for minor criminal cases (Miethe and Lu 2005; Beckett 
and Harris 2011; Harris, Evans, and Beckett 2011). If a person was not able to pay fines, 
they could be subjected to physical penalties and penal servitude (Miethe and Lu 2005; 
Beckett and Harris 2011). Financial penalties were also found in the southern states. The 
implementation of punishment by monetary sanction set the groundwork for the convict 
lease system, which existed from emancipation until the 1940s (Beckett and Harris 2011).   
While monetary sanctions have been commonplace since the establishment of the 
United States, they have been in and out of favor throughout American history (Atkinson 
2015). In the 1970s came a change in the perceived effectiveness of fines. During this 
decade, judges did not believe fines could change the behavior of individuals because 
fine amounts were too low to have a deterrent value on the rich, but too high and 
therefore unenforceable on the poor (Atkinson 2015). An investigation by the NPR found 
that the practice of sentencing defendants and offenders with increasing amounts of 
monetary sanctions is “a practice that causes the poor to face harsher treatment than 
16 
 
others who commit identical crimes and can afford to pay” (Shapiro 2014). By the late 
1980s, fines were the preferred punishment against criminal offenders. 
An inmate survey conducted by Harris et al. (2010), found that the use of 
monetary sanctions is now common in most US states and in the federal system. Fines are 
often accompanied by one or more other sanctions (DeLisi and Conis 2013). Financial 
sanctions are highly regarded because they are easy and cost efficient to administer and 
do not require additional criminal agencies to enforce (Klein 1997; Goldblatt and Lewis 
1998; Einat 2008), they generate revenue for the state and local government (Butterfield 
2004; Einat 2008), and the emergence of broken windows policing has law enforcement 
focusing on low level violations that without fines, would go unenforced (Atkinson 
2015). Further, fines are compatible with dessert-based sentencing and are considered to 
be a humane punishment. They can be scaled to the severity of the specific offense, as 
well as the criminal history and income of the specific offender (Uglow 1995; Einat 
2008). As Rusche and Kirschheimer (1939:169) stated, “the fine costs the state nothing 
while procuring the maximum penal effect.” 
While monetary sanctions have been around for decades, offenders must now pay 
for many services that were once free and the dollar amounts charged have grown 
substantially due to the increasing cost of running the nation’s criminal justice system 
(Shapiro 2014). For example, in the late 1970s the court upheld an Oregon statute 
allowing the courts to charge offenders for the legal representation that is provided to 
them by the state because of their indigent socioeconomic status (Fuller v. Oregon 1974). 
Other services paid for by offenders include room and board for jail stays, probation and 
parole supervision, sex offender registry and annual fee, and the electronic monitoring 
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devices they are ordered to wear and use (Iowa Code, Chapter 356, Section 7; Iowa Code, 
Chapter 692A, Section 110; Iowa Code, Chapter 905, Section 14; Shapiro 2014).   
Monetary sanctions are proposed to act as a specific and general deterrent, 
retribution, and rehabilitation to prevent recidivism (Hillsman and Green 1992; Ashworth 
2000; Einat 2008; Atkinson 2015). The restitution component of monetary sanctions is 
proposed to work as a function of restoration (Ervin and Schneider 1990; Ruback 2002). 
Per Ruback (2011), many scholars believe monetary sanctions have some penological 
value. However, many other researchers are concluding monetary sanctions solely 
provide the retributive goal of the criminal justice systems and are not corrective in any 
fashion (O’Malley 2011). A study by Bouffard and Muftić (2007) found offenders who 
received fines were more likely to recidivate than persons sentenced to community 
service. A complete analysis of court-ordered monetary sanctions includes the four types 
of sanctions imposed in Iowa, ability to pay, and collection methods. 
 
Costs, fines, and surcharges 
The monetary sanction variable in Iowa includes four types of sanctions: costs, 
fines, restitution, and surcharges. These sanctions are imposed by the courts and other 
criminal justice agencies on persons accused or convicted of crimes. Research has 
typically focused on only one element of the monetary sanction variable (Ruback 2004). 
The following study examines all elements of the monetary sanction variable because 
during sentencing, they are generally not applied in isolation. 
Costs are payments to reimburse the state and local jurisdictions for the costs of 
the criminal justice procedure. They cover the expenses of prosecution, confinement, and 
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community supervision. Typically, costs have a standard dollar rate for each criminal 
charge (Ruback 2004). Fines are monetary penalties, imposed to act as punishment for 
committing a specific crime. They can be either mandatory or by the discretion of the 
judge. While there is flexibility on fine imposition, jurisdictions normally have a “going 
rate” for each offense and therefore violators pay similar amounts (Hillsman and Greene 
1992; Ruback 2004). Surcharges are add-on amounts for generating revenue for goals not 
necessarily related to the criminal justice procedure. In Iowa, surcharges are typically 
either criminal penalty surcharges or law enforcement initiative surcharges (Legislative 
Services Agency 2009). Both costs and fines are typically sentenced without 
consideration of the offender’s ability to pay (Beckett and Harris 2011; Council of 
Economic Advisers 2015) and can be raised at the discretion of the city (Atkinson 2015). 
Monetary sanctions can be thought of in two ways:  an alternative to incarceration 
to reduce the rate of imprisonment or a supplemental punishment to incarceration. In the 
United States, “… no sentencing guidelines scheme contains a provision for the use of 
fines in place of incarceration, while several jurisdictions… limit the fine to a 
supplemental role, something to be imposed in addition to the real sentence” (Morris and 
Tonry 1990:116-17). According to Iowa Code, Chapter 909, Section 2, “the court may 
impose a fine in addition to confinement, where such is authorized.” If monetary 
sanctions are an additional sentence to imprisonment, then the motive to reduce the rate 
of imprisonment disappears (O’Malley 2011).  
Court-ordered monetary sanctions are not only imposed on felonies or serious 
crimes. Harris et al. (2010) found that “across the United States, two-thirds of felons 
sentenced to prison, and more than 80% of other felons and misdemeanants, were 
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assessed fees and fines by the courts in 2004.” They are the normative punishment in 
cases of misdemeanors, quasi-criminal ordinance violations, and civil infractions (Gupta 
and Foster 2016). Historically, very little attention has been given to monetary sanctions, 
but recently they have seen an increase in attention likely due to the 2014 riots in 
Ferguson, Missouri. Investigation revealed unconstitutional racially based monetary 
sanction punishment practices on small-time, poor offenders by the Ferguson police and 
city court system (Perez 2016).  
 
Restitution 
 Restitution is a court-ordered payment an offender must pay to their victim(s) to 
compensate them for any out-of-pocket losses directly relating to the crime. More 
specifically, restitution includes, but is not limited to, medical expenses, therapy costs, 
prescription charges, counseling expenses, lost wages, lost or damaged property, 
expenses related to participating in the criminal justice process, and funeral expenses 
(U.S. Department of Justice 2002; DeLisi and Conis 2013). Restitution is only imposed 
when specific and direct victims are suffered financial losses (Beckett and Harris 2011). 
Because of society’s concern for victims, it would be politically correct to exclude 
restitution from analysis of monetary sanctions influence on recidivism. An alternative 
reason for exclusion of restitution is that it is driven by case-specific factors and is an 
uncontrollable variable (Harris et al. 2011). However, there are also good reasons to 
include it in analysis.  
First, while restitution is now victim oriented, it was historically entrenched in 
rehabilitative purposes; it was an offender-focused remedy, in addition to providing 
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compensation to victims (Ruback 2011). Second, restitution has the same problems as 
court costs, fines, and surcharges. Payment rates are low. In two national studies, 
collection rates ranged from 45 percent (Smith, Davis, and Hillenbrand 1989) to 54 
percent (Cohen 1995). Finally, all elements of monetary sanctions create problems of 
debt, unemployment, and increase revocation rates for offenders (Ruback 2011). In fact, 
mandatory restitution and victim compensation amounts have increased in the last twenty 
years causing substantially more debt for offenders (Katzenstein and Nagrecha 2011).  
While restitution amounts are increasing, it is theorized that this variable of court-
ordered monetary sanctions may not have the negative effects seen with costs, fines, and 
surcharges. Consistent with reintegrative shaming theory, restitution can be an effective 
rehabilitative device (Eglash 1958; Jacob 1970) by enabling offenders to take 
responsibility for their actions and make amends to their victims without stigmatization 
(Braithewaite 1989; Ruback 2002). While limited, research has indicated that 
successfully paying restitution is one of the strongest predictors of lowered recidivism 
(Ervin and Schneider 1990; Ruback 2002). One study compared male property offenders 
released to the Minnesota Restitution Center to a group of matched offenders released to 
conventional parole supervision. They found the restitution group had lower recidivism 
rates compared to those on conventional parole (Heinz, Galaway, and Hudson 1976). 
While informal restitution arrangements, like the Minnesota Restitution Center, have 
been found to be more effective than formal restitution (i.e., assigned through the court), 
formal restitution has still been found more effective in reducing recidivism than 
incarceration (Ruback 2002). 
 
21 
 
Ability to pay 
The inception of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment in 1791 included the 
Excessive Fines Clause, which until recently, received minimal attention from courts or 
scholars. Following the 1998 court case United States v. Bajakajian, the Excessive Fines 
Clause has been read, “as long as a penalty is not grossly disproportionate to its 
accompanying offense, it is not barred by the Eighth Amendment” (McLean 2013:834). 
After much debate and still much confusion, the Excessive Fines Clause can be 
read in two complementary, but distinct, parts. The first part is the proportionality 
principle, which links the penalty to the offense and the second part is an additional 
limiting principle, which links the penalty imposed to the offender’s economic status and 
current life situation (McLean 2013).  
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2001) made the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment 
applicable to the states (McLean 2013). Many states, including Iowa, include an 
excessive fines clause in their constitution. Iowa Constitution Article 1, §17 states, 
“excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and 
unusual punishment shall not be inflicted.” Even with these clarifications the Excessive 
Fines Clause continues to cause confusion and many states do not utilize an offender’s 
ability to pay. After thorough examination of practices in the fifteen states with the 
highest prison populations, Diller, Bannon, and Nagrecha (2010:13) concluded: 
Despite the fact that most criminal defendants are indigent, none of the fifteen 
states examined pay adequate attention to whether individuals have the resources 
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to pay criminal justice debt, either when courts determine how much debt to 
impose or during the debt collection process. 
Courts should inquire into an offender’s financial status when assessing monetary 
sanctions, rather than waiting until a person fails to pay.  
 In nineteenth century England, the courts considered an offenders ability to pay, 
but ran into difficulties during application. The fine could not exceed an offender’s 
capacity to pay and it must exceed the benefits derived from the illegal act, but no 
solution was found that would not violate one or the other of these requirements (Rusche 
and Kirchheimer 1939). “The system must assume that those who are fined are capable of 
paying, and it thus justifies imprisonment for nonpayment” (Rusche and Kirchheimer 
1939). As a result, prisons filled up due to nonpayment of fines either because offenders 
were unable to pay or because they fraudulently refused to pay. Changes were deemed 
necessary and maximum incarceration terms were set for convicts of proven insolvency 
(Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939). 
 In the United States, imprisonment for nonpayment also occurred and court cases 
developed out of feelings of injustice. Tate v. Short (1971) determined an indigent 
offender may not be imprisoned for nonpayment of a fine for offenses which a fine is the 
only punishment authorized. It was determined this decision was not sufficient and 
Bearden v. Georgia (1983) determined local government can only imprison someone for 
nonpayment if it can be proven that the offender could have paid the fine, but “willfully” 
chose not to. The current Iowa Code, Chapter 909, Section 7 states: 
A defendant is presumed to be able to pay a fine. However, if the defendant 
proves to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant cannot pay the fine, the  
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defendant shall not be sentenced to confinement for the failure to pay the fine. 
Many debtors enter the criminal justice system indigent and are made more so by 
the stigma of their new criminal record (Burch 2011). Therefore, for indigent individuals, 
monetary sanctions contribute to an ever-growing amount of legal debt and cycle of 
poverty that can be nearly impossible to escape. Attorney Vanessa Torres Hernandez 
stated, “If you have resources, a court fee isn’t a big deal. You can pay that money. You 
can walk free. But for people who are already poor, the court fine and fee is in essence an 
additional sentence” (Shapiro 2014). 
 
Collection 
The collection process in Iowa is laxer than in other states, but it is undoubtedly  
difficult for those who classify as indigent. Unpaid legal obligations can be subject to 
interest, surcharges, and collection fees. Late fees are charged by nearly every 
jurisdiction and accrue quickly. Some states, like California and Florida, charge dollar 
amount late fees after a specific number of days or after each late payment; other states 
charge proportional fees and/or interest (Atkinson 2015). In Iowa, monetary sanctions not 
paid within thirty days are statutorily deemed delinquent and are assigned to the 
Centralized Collection Unit (CCU) who add a ten percent fee to cover collection costs 
(Legislative Services Agency 2014).  
To avoid late fees, many jurisdictions allow payment plans. However, to take 
advantage of this payment plan service, some places charge a fee. This is a perplexing 
notion because those in requirement of payment plans typically are those least able to 
pay. Per Atkinson (2015:206), “some fees are modest – $10 in Virginia – but others are 
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much higher, such as $25 in Florida and $100 in New Orleans.” I am aware of no county 
in Iowa that charges a payment plan fee. While no payment plan fee may be charged, 
most payment plans in Iowa begin at $50 a month through the courts (Iowa Judicial 
Branch 2016) or $100 a month through a county attorney’s office. 
In Iowa, sixty days after the debt is deemed delinquent court-ordered monetary 
sanction debt may be turned over to a county attorney or a debt collector that is under 
contract with the Judicial Branch (Iowa Judicial Branch 2016). After one year, if the debt 
is not in an established payment plan with the CCU and has not been assigned to a county 
attorney, the debt will be turned over to a private debt collector who adds a 25 percent 
collection fee (Legislative Services Agency 2014).  
As mentioned previously, many offenders are indigent and therefore do not have 
money to pay their monetary sanctions. According to Judicial Branch (2013), the total 
outstanding court debt owed to the State of Iowa in 2013 was $633.5 million, 72 percent 
being criminal debt. Table 2 shows the collection rates in Iowa by case type. Typically, 
the more serious a case, the lower the collection rate. 
Table 2: Iowa Collection Rates by Case Type 
Case Type Collection Rate 
Felonies 11.7% 
Aggravated Misdemeanor 17.2% 
Serious Misdemeanor 26.5% 
Simple Misdemeanor 37.7% 
OWI 36.4% 
Note: Collection rate information from Legislative Services Agency (2014) 
If an individual does not pay their debt, attempts to collect may occur through 
issuance of wage garnishments, tax rebate interception, driver’s license suspensions, 
denial of automotive registration renewals, use of warrants for seizure and sale of 
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personal property, and a contempt of court action for failure to pay court debt may be 
filed against the individual (DeLisi and Conis 2013; Iowa Judicial Branch 2016). Many in 
the scholarly community have concerns regarding these additional collection means (i.e. 
wage garnishments and driver’s license suspensions). A driver’s license can be crucial to 
maintaining a job, caring for families, and taking care of legal matters. Gupta and Foster 
(2016:7) stated, “suspending defendant’s licenses decreases the likelihood that defendants 
will resolve pending cases and outstanding court debts. …states and local courts are 
encouraged to avoid suspending driver’s licenses as a debt collection tool…” Issuance of 
a wage garnishment can take up to 25 percent of the disposable income, further depleting 
the wealth and resources of the already disadvantaged, and leave little left for other 
financial responsibilities.  
Some researchers argue that the difficulties involved in collection will force some 
offenders to commit another offense to pay their monetary sanctions (Clark 1998; Einat 
2004; Einat 2008). McLean and Thompson (2007:22) also discuss difficulties 
surrounding fine collection, “such a situation could inadvertently encourage a person to 
return to the behavior and illegal activities that resulted in the person’s incarceration in 
the first place.”  
 
General Strain Theory as Theoretical Framework  
General strain theory (GST), first postulated by Agnew (1992), has received much 
support since its introduction and is now one of the leading theories of crime. GST posits 
that stressful life events or personal strains create negative emotions which result in 
criminal behavior in the absence of strong conventional coping skills (Agnew 1992; 
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Broidy and Agnew 1997). GST expands on classic strain theory, suggesting a range of 
sources, not only financially induced negative experiences, can lead to stress. 
According to classic strain theory, society puts pressure on individuals to achieve 
socially accepted goals in society, but they lack the means (e.g. middle-class status or 
monetary success) (Merton 1938). The inability to achieve the desired status or wealth 
through legal means creates a significant amount of strain on the individual. This strain 
may lead them to solve their yearning for status or wealth by engaging in criminal 
behavior. 
Classic strain theory received much criticism and in response Agnew offered a 
more general explanation of crime encapsulating additional sources of strain that may 
drive an individual toward a criminal lifestyle. GST included three categories of strains: 
the inability to achieve positively valued goals, the removal of, or threat to remove, 
positively valued stimuli, and the presentation of a threat with harmful or negatively 
valued stimuli. The stress literature notes a sharp distinction between objective stressors 
and how an individual subjectively assesses those stressors (Agnew 2013). The four 
characteristics of strain, all of which are subjective strains, most likely to lead to crime 
are strains are seen as unjust, strains are seen as high in magnitude, strains are associated 
with low social control, and strains create pressure or incentive to engage in criminal 
coping (Agnew 2001; Agnew 2013). 
These strain characteristics increase crime partly through affecting certain 
negative emotional states (Botchkovar, Tittle, and Antonaccio 2013), predominantly 
anger (Agnew 2013) and frustration (Agnew 2001). These negative emotions create 
pressure for corrective action. Corrective action has three broad and often overlapping 
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coping choices: emotional, cognitive, and behavioral coping (Botchkovar et al. 2013). 
Emotional coping, such as using drugs, helps individuals relax or manage stress. 
Cognitive coping helps positively reinterpret the strain. Lastly, behavioral coping, 
involves physical action to diminish the strain.  
“Because coping techniques may vary in effectiveness, people often employ more 
than one method of dealing with strain” (Agnew 2006:91). The need for corrective action 
does not automatically lead to illegitimate coping behaviors, but it is more likely if 
conventional coping resources are scarce (i.e. conventional social support and self-
control), which is the case among many low socioeconomic status individuals (Agnew 
1992; Agnew 2006; Botchkovar et al. 2013). 
Illegitimate coping behaviors primarily reside in the emotional and behavioral 
realms. Crime may be used as a method of coping to reduce strain, seek revenge, and/or 
alleviate negative emotions (Agnew 2001; Agnew 2013; Listwan, Sullivan, Agnew, 
Cullen, and Colvin 2013). Monetary strains are strongly associated with income-
generating crimes (Felson, Osgood, Horney, and Wiernik 2012) because they provide a 
quick solution to money problems (Agnew 2013). During qualitative interviews 
conducted by Harris, Evans, and Beckett (2010:1785) they concluded, “it is conceivable 
that legal debt creates an incentive to seek illegal means to support themselves and, 
ironically, to make legal financial obligation payments, a pattern that would further 
increase the risk of criminal justice involvement.” Monetary strains may also lead to the 
use of illegal drugs to cope with depression, anxiety, and hopelessness, as well as violent 
behavior to relieve anger and resentment (De Coster and Kort-Butler 2006; Agnew 
2013). They may also affect feelings of self-worth, self-respect, and self-determination 
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(Atkinson 2015). Depression and anxiety, which are often comorbid, impact both internal 
and external focus and makes living a conventional life difficult. 
No matter the coping method, it is apparent court-ordered monetary sanctions 
have the potential to strain already difficult lives and lead individuals to engage in 
criminal behavior. According to Alexes Harris, “the people most likely to face arrest and 
go through the courts are poor” (Shapiro 2014). Because most offenders are classified as 
indigent, court-ordered monetary sanctions are paid on a sliding scale. Therefore, these 
monetary sanctions do not drive offenders into poverty, but they serve as a strain, 
influencing decisions toward further pursuing a criminal lifestyle. Because poverty 
affects decision making by creating resource scarcity (Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir 
2012), crime is an easy way of responding to pressing demands. 
Scarcity can create anger, which has a special place in the strain literature. Anger 
creates a circle of poor decision making because it disrupts cognitive processes in ways 
that impede noncriminal coping and it reduces the actual and perceived costs of crime 
(Agnew 2001). Scarcity further affects decision making by eliciting greater focus to 
pressing problems, while leading to the neglect of others, without sufficient attention to 
whether the benefits outweigh the costs (Shah et al. 2012). The financial scarcity 
offenders face due to their socioeconomic status as indigent and the pressing demands of 
criminal justice debt may affect their decision making by turning attention to monetary 
problems (i.e. paying off court-ordered monetary sanctions and having money to pay for 
life necessities) and neglecting the problematic possibility of being rearrested, sent back 
to prison, and charged with more monetary debt. “Similarly, many sociologists have 
noted that people with a criminal conviction are at a high risk of reoffending and that 
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rearrest and reincarceration reproduce poverty” (Harris et al. 2010). During an interview 
by Maruna (2001:71), one offender stated: 
I was homeless, I couldn’t get a YTS job (Youth Training Scheme, a government 
sponsored program), and like I couldn’t get benefit, but I still had like over £1,000 
in fines that I had to pay at £8 a week. So I’m stuck in this rut. I’ve got to pay 
these fines or I’ve got to go to jail, and I’ve got to live as well. So, I was 
committing more crimes, going back to court and getting more fines, and it was 
just a vicious cycle. So the next thing I ended up back in prison again. 
Poverty, increased by an overwhelming amount of court debt may drive offenders to acts 
of desperation, including returning to a life of crime. 
A study conducted by Harris et al. (2010) utilized large samples of national and 
state-level court data and interviews (n=50) to assess the imposition and social and legal 
consequences of court-ordered monetary sanctions. Examining prison inmate data, they 
concluded that a large majority of the prison population received monetary sanctions 
substantial to the individuals expected earnings (Harris et al. 2010). This 2004 study 
included Iowa prisoners (n=51) and observed 67 percent were sentenced with monetary 
sanctions (Harris et al. 2010).  
 During the interview process, a minority of individuals (20%) indicated that 
making payments towards their legal debt was not unduly burdensome, the remaining 
interviews indicated legal debt reduced family income and increased the likelihood of 
ongoing criminal activity (Harris et al. 2010). One respondent was quoted by Harris et al. 
(2010:1785) stating: 
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And my last PO, I asked her for a bus ticket to get to my appointments; she’s like, 
oh, we don’t do that anymore. I’m like, oh, OK, I’m not supposed to do any 
crime, I’m not supposed to… and frankly, I mean, I’m not trying or wanting to do 
any crime, and I still can’t quite commit myself to do prostitution, but I think 
about it sometimes… at least that way I could pay some of these damn fines. 
Several other respondents also indicated that monetary sanctions encouraged them to 
return to a life of crime. 
Lastly, a study by Diller et al. (2010) examined monetary sanction practices in the 
fifteen states with the highest prison populations. The states examined were California, 
Texas, Florida, New York, Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Arizona, 
North Carolina, Louisiana, Virginia, Alabama, and Missouri, which account for over half 
of all state criminal filings. Thorough research and interviews with individuals involved 
in the criminal justice system led them to the following conclusions: monetary sanctions 
regularly total hundreds to thousands of dollars in debt, this punishment practice creates 
an endless cycle of debt, and financial sanctions create a barrier to those attempting to 
rebuild their lives after a criminal conviction and charts a path back to prison (Diller et al. 
2010).  
It can be concluded that court-ordered monetary sanctions can act as a strain, 
which in turn requires corrective action. This corrective action may result in criminal 
activity to reduce strain, seek revenge, and/or alleviate negative emotions (Agnew 2001; 
Agnew 2013; Listwan, Sullivan, Agnew, Cullen, and Colvin 2013). 
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CHAPTER III 
 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Chapter three details the research design and methodology utilized to conduct the 
current study. It presents the research hypotheses proposed for the analyses, participants 
and variables, steps done to prepare the data set for analysis, and the analytical plan. This 
study is a quantitative analysis of total monetary sanction amount and total restitution 
amount ordered by the court in relation to recidivism. Secondary data comes from the 
fiscal year 2015 dataset collected by the Iowa Department of Correction stored in the 
Iowa Correctional Offender Network (ICON) system, which contains information on a 
variety of topics related to the criminality and sociodemographic characteristics of each 
offender included in the study. Data also comes from Iowa Courts Online 
(https://www.iowacourts.state.ia.us), which contains information on the monetary 
sanction amounts of each offender included in the study. 
 
Research Hypotheses   
The research hypotheses in this study concern the effect large amounts of court-
ordered monetary sanctions can have on recidivism. Specifically, they address the total 
amount of court-ordered monetary sanctions, including fines, costs, restitution, and 
surcharges, as well as exclusively the total amount of restitution offenders were charged 
with and how such large sanction amounts may affect criminal behavior. The research 
hypotheses are as follows: 
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1.  As total court-ordered monetary sanction amount increases, the reported 
instances of return to prison will increase. 
2. As total court-ordered restitution amount increases, the reported instances of 
return to prison will decrease. 
3. The total court-ordered monetary sanction amounts predict above and beyond 
known predictors (i.e. age, sex, race, criminal history, SES) of recidivism with 
regard to reported instances of resentence to prison. 
 
Quantitative Analysis 
 This study’s main purpose is to determine if court-ordered monetary sanctions 
affect the recidivism of Iowa criminal offenders. Specifically, the quantitative analysis 
will help determine if larger amounts of court-ordered monetary sanctions have an 
increased effect on recidivism rate. Likewise, the quantitative analysis will also help 
determine if larger amounts of court-ordered restitution have a decreased effect on 
recidivism rate. The criminal justice system uses all aspects of monetary sanctions as 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution (Hillsman and Green 1992; Atkinson 2015). 
Restitution is specifically used as restoration and is theorized to restore the victim and 
offender, lowering the recidivism rate (Ervin and Schneider 1990; Ruback 2002). 
Deterrence relies on the threat of punishment to be effective, and while the most 
commonly associated type of punishment is incarceration, court-ordered monetary 
sanctions are closely behind. The criminal justice system has increased the severity of 
punishment through utilization of harsher, more expensive court-ordered monetary 
sanctions (Legislative Services Agency 2009). However, court-ordered monetary 
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sanctions may prove to be ineffective instruments of deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution if offenders are entering the criminal justice system indigent and under 
considerable monetary strain. Thus, indicating large amounts of court-ordered monetary 
sanctions increase the rate of recidivism for criminal offenders. However, restitution, as 
the literature suggests, may prove to be an effective instrument of restoration for 
offenders, thus affecting the rate of recidivism for criminal offenders in the opposite way. 
Data for this study come from a sample of 729 first-time Iowa prisoners exiting 
prison or work release by way of parole, special sentence or discharge-end of sentence 
between July 1, 2011 and June 30, 2012. The individuals were then tracked for three 
years after their release for instances of recidivism. The measure of recidivism tracked 
involves a return to prison with or without a new sentence. Four thousand seven hundred 
and forty individuals exited prison or work release in Iowa between the study parameters. 
Of these individuals, 2,505 were first-time prisoners, and from there 752 offenders were 
randomly chosen. After preparing the data set, 23 offenders were excluded from the 
study.  
Only first-time prisoners were included in this study to observe the effect court-
ordered monetary sanctions have on offenders, without having to take into consideration 
those with an already extensive criminal career. Recidivism rates are usually reported by 
the DOC for all prisoners. Because “less than ten percent of criminals commit more than 
fifty percent of crimes and even higher percentages of violent crimes” (DeLisi and Conis 
2013: 39), recidivism rates presented in this paper differ from Iowa’s 31.9 percent 
recidivism rate (Iowa Department of Corrections 2016). 
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The main data set comes from data collected by the Iowa Department of 
Corrections. The Iowa DOC has been collecting and analyzing recidivism rates annually 
beginning with persons leaving prison in the 2004 fiscal year. They use this information 
to develop strategies to improve recidivism outcomes. The data set consists of mostly 
complete demographics, convicting offense descriptions, and recidivism information for 
each offender. The data set therefore facilitates a secondary analysis of recidivism 
statistics and was obtained, with IRB approval, from Jerry Bartruff, Director at the Iowa 
Department of Corrections (see Appendix A and B).  
Along with the information provided from the main data set, court-ordered 
monetary sanction amounts were extracted from Iowa Courts Online. Specifically, the 
monetary sanction amounts for fines, costs, restitution, and surcharges were extracted for 
the complied amount of monetary sanctions for all court cases prior to and including the 
offense that convicted the offender to incarceration. The solitary restitution amount 
variable for all court cases prior to and including the offense that convicted the offender 
to incarceration was also recorded. 
This study analyzes what effects, if any, the amount of court-ordered monetary 
sanction and the amount of court-ordered restitution have on the recidivism of criminal 
offenders in Iowa. It also analyzes whether or not the amount of court-ordered monetary 
sanction and the amount of court-ordered restitution predicts above and beyond known 
predictors of recidivism with regard to reported instances of resentence to prison.  
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Sample 
 The sample comprised 752 adult offenders who were released from the Iowa 
prison system over a twelve-month period in 2011-2012. Although all 752 individuals 
had complete recidivism data, 21 of the individuals had their initial prison conviction 
expunged therefore removing court-ordered monetary sanction data from the study and 
two of the individuals were deceased before the end of the three-year study period. 
Therefore, the final sample consisted of 729 adult offenders. Sociodemographic 
information in relation to the final sample and recidivist subsample is presented in Table 
3. At the time of release from prison, the final sample’s mean age was 33.59 years 
(SD=10.27) and the recidivist subsample’s mean age was 33.13 years (SD=9.9). The final 
sample’s mean LSI-R score was 30.18 (SD=7.53) and the recidivist subsample’s mean 
LSI-R score was 29.78 (SD=7.39). These scores fall in the moderate risk category. 
Table 3: Sociodemographic Information about Final Sample and Recidivist Subsample  
 Complete Sample 
(N = 729) 
Recidivist Subsample 
(N = 138) 
Variables N % N % 
Sex 
     Male 
     Female 
 
635  
94  
 
87.1% 
12.9% 
 
120 
18  
 
86.96% 
13.04% 
Race 
     White 
     Black 
     American Indian or Alaskan Native 
     Asian or Pacific Islander 
 
532  
179  
14  
4  
 
72.98% 
24.55% 
1.92% 
.55% 
 
109  
26  
2  
1  
 
78.99% 
18.84% 
1.45% 
.72% 
Ethnic origin 
     Non-Hispanic 
     Hispanic 
 
668  
61  
 
91.63% 
8.37% 
 
131  
7  
 
94.93% 
5.07% 
State public defender (SES variable) 
     Yes 
     No 
 
693  
36  
 
95.06% 
4.94% 
 
132 
6 
 
95.65% 
4.35% 
Recidivate 
     No 
     Yes 
 
591  
138  
 
81.07% 
18.93% 
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Measures 
Indicators of monetary sanctions (i.e. total sanction amount and total restitution 
amount) and socioeconomic status (i.e. attorney of record) were gathered through review 
of public court records on Iowa Court Online. Official criminal data (i.e. prison 
conviction and recidivism information) and sociodemographic data for study sample were 
received in October 2016 from the Iowa Department of Corrections (DOC).  
Table 4 shows descriptive information regarding the monetary sanction variables. 
Total sanction amount was defined as the total amount of costs, fines, restitution, and 
surcharges of all Iowa court charges up to and including the charges sentencing the 
offender to their initial prison sentence (M=$18,936.54, SD=40,427.22, range=292.03-
655,505.30). Total restitution amount was defined as the total amount of restitution of all 
Iowa court charges up to and including the charges sentencing the offender to their initial 
prison sentence (M=$6,165.59, SD=36,939.59, range=0-653,791.80).  
Table 4: Monetary Sanction Descriptive Statistics of Complete Sample 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Total Sanction Amount $18936.54 40427.22 $292.03 $655505.30 
Total Restitution Amount $6165.59 36939.59 $0.00 $653791.80 
 
Controls for age at release (M=33.59, SD=10.27, range=18-71), sex (87.1% male 
[coded as 0], 12.9% female [coded as 1]), White (72.98%, coded as 0), and 
socioeconomic status represented by retainment of state-appointed attorney (95.06% yes 
[coded as 0], 4.94% no [coded as 1]) were included. 
Initial prison conviction charge information, specifically information on the most 
serious offense for which the offender was sentenced to prison, in relation to the final 
sample and the recidivist subsample is presented in Table 5. For purposes of using this 
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variable in analysis, 131 committed offenses were re-coded into five individual 
categories: drug (67.49% no [coded as 0], 32.51% yes [coded as 1]), property (72.43% no 
[coded as 0], 27.57% yes [coded as 1]), violent (76.13% no [coded as 0], 23.87% yes 
[coded as 1]), public order [86.29% no [coded as 0], 13.71% yes [coded as 1]), and other 
(97.67% no [coded as 0], 2.33% yes [coded as 1]) , and further broken down into 
subtypes. 
Table 5: Initial Prison Conviction for Final Sample and Recidivist Subsample 
 Complete Sample 
(N=729) 
Recidivist Subsample 
(N=138) 
Variables N % N % 
Offense Type 
     Drug 
     Property 
     Violent 
     Public order 
     Other 
 
237  
201  
174  
100  
17  
 
32.51% 
27.57% 
23.87% 
13.71% 
2.33% 
 
59 
40 
25 
7 
7 
 
42.75% 
28.98% 
18.12% 
5.07% 
5.07% 
Drug Subtype 
     Drug possession 
     Trafficking 
     Other drug 
 
16 
208 
13 
 
2.19% 
28.53% 
1.78% 
 
0 
58 
1 
 
0 
42.03% 
.72% 
Property Subtype 
     Arson 
     Burglary 
     Forgery/Fraud 
     Theft 
     Vandalism 
 
4 
95 
26 
65 
11 
 
.55% 
13.03% 
3.57% 
8.92% 
1.51% 
 
1 
18 
4 
16 
1 
 
.72% 
13.04% 
2.9% 
11.6% 
.72% 
Violent Subtype 
     Assault 
     Murder/Manslaughter 
     Robbery 
     Sex 
     Other violent 
 
87 
20 
10 
44 
13 
 
11.93% 
2.74% 
1.37% 
6.04% 
1.78% 
 
4 
3 
1 
14 
3 
 
2.9% 
2.17% 
.72% 
10.14% 
2.17% 
Note: Offense listed was the offender’s most serious offense 
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Table 5: Continued 
 Complete Sample 
(N=729) 
Recidivist Subsample 
(N=138) 
 N % N % 
Public Order Subtype 
     Alcohol 
     OWI 
     Sex offender registry/residency 
     Weapons 
     Traffic 
     Other public order 
 
6 
54 
14 
18 
6 
2 
 
.82% 
7.41% 
1.92% 
2.47% 
.82% 
.27% 
 
0 
4 
1 
2 
0 
0 
 
0 
2.9% 
.72% 
1.45% 
0 
0 
Other Subtype 
     Animals 
     Special sentence revocation 
     Other criminal 
 
2 
12 
3 
 
.27% 
1.65% 
.41% 
 
0 
6 
1 
 
0 
4.35% 
.72% 
Note: Offense listed was the offender’s most serious offense 
Recidivism (81.07% no [coded as 0], 18.93% yes [coded as 1]), was the variable 
of interest. Recidivism was defined as the first return to prison following discharge from 
prison or work release during the 2012 fiscal year. Recidivism to prison can be the result 
of either a technical violation or a new charge that occurred during the three-year follow-
up period. As shown in Table 6, the recidivism dependent variable was further broken 
down. Days to recidivism was also analyzed (M=403.33 days, SD=270.04, range=29-
1,079). This study and the Iowa DOC use recidivism definitions and terms developed by 
the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA) and used extensively in 
research documents to establish standard performance measures of importance to 
corrections (Durose et al. 2014; King and Elderbroom 2014; National Institute of Justice 
2014; Association of State Correctional Administrators 2015; Iowa Department of 
Corrections 2016).  
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Table 6: Information about Recidivism Offense Types and Subtypes  
 Recidivists Subsample  
(N=138) 
Variables N % 
Recidivism Offense Type 
     Drug  
     Property 
     Violent 
     Public order 
     Other 
     Technical 
 
24  
7 
6 
18 
1 
82 
 
17.39% 
5.07% 
4.35% 
13.04% 
0.72% 
59.42% 
Drug Subtype 
     Drug possession 
     Trafficking 
     Other drug 
 
9 
14 
1 
 
6.52% 
10.14% 
0.72% 
Property Subtype 
     Burglary 
     Theft 
 
1 
6 
 
0.72% 
4.35% 
Violent Subtype 
     Assault 
     Kidnap 
 
5 
1 
 
3.62% 
0.72% 
Public Order Subtype 
     OWI 
     Weapons 
     Traffic 
     Flight/Escape 
     Other public order 
 
1 
2 
2 
11 
2 
 
0.72% 
1.45% 
1.45% 
7.97% 
1.45% 
Other Subtype 
     Other criminal 
 
1 
 
1.45% 
 
Preparing the data set 
 With a data set of this size, several offenders are likely to have missing or 
incomplete information in some variables that are important to this research. Many 
variables, if there is not a known entry, have the option to leave a value blank, indicating 
the information is ‘unknown’. For each step of the analyses (logistic regression, ROC 
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curve analysis, negative binomial regression, and two-sample t-test), cases are selected to 
be included if, and only if, they do not have any value necessary for the analyses marked 
as ‘unknown’.  
Some offenders had their initial prison conviction expunged therefore removing 
court-ordered monetary sanction data from the study (Iowa Code, Chapter 901C, Section 
2) and two of the individuals were deceased before the end of the three-year study period. 
These offenders were removed from analysis. 
 
Analytical plan  
In this study, four analytical techniques were used to analyze the effect of 
monetary sanctions on recidivism rates of Iowa offenders. First, logistic regression was 
conducted for general drug recidivism, general property recidivism, and general violent 
recidivism. Logistic regression is the appropriate regression analysis to conduct because 
the dependent variable, recidivism, is binary (no=0, yes=1) (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and 
Sturdivant 2013). Each general type of recidivism was further broken down by male and 
female analysis. Further, each general type of recidivism was broken down into subtypes: 
drug possession recidivism, trafficking recidivism, burglary recidivism, theft recidivism, 
kidnap recidivism, and assault recidivism.  
Second, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis was conducted for 
drug recidivism, property recidivism, and violent recidivism. ROC curve analysis 
provides a measure of area under the curve (AUC). AUC provides the probability that the 
offender’s total sanction amount or total restitution amount can predict who does 
recidivate and who does not. The AUC statistic ranges from a value of 0.5 (indicating 
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chance predictive power for recidivism) to a value of 1.0 (indicating perfect predictive 
power for recidivism). The greater the AUC statistic, the better is the predictive power of 
the monetary sanction amount.  
Third, a negative binomial regression model was used to estimate whether total 
sanction amount and total restitution amount were associated with days until recidivism. 
This is the appropriate statistical technique since the dependent variable, days until 
recidivism, is a count variable and the variance is greater than the mean (Hoffmann 
2004). The model included monetary sanction variables, total sanction amount and total 
restitution amount, as well as sociodemographics and prior conviction types.  
Fourth, two-sample t-tests were estimated to determine if statistically significant 
differences existed between public-attorney and private attorney groups for the covariates 
and LSI-R scores. T-tests highlight any significant between group differences within the 
respective samples (DeLisi, Barnes, Beaver, and Gibson 2009). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 RESULTS 
 
Logistic Regression Analysis for Drug Recidivism 
 As shown in Table 7, neither total sanction amount nor total restitution amount 
were significantly associated with general drug recidivism. While the variables of interest 
were not significantly associated, having a drug offense from initial prison conviction 
was strongly associated with general drug recidivism (OR=8.002, SE=4.168, z=3.99, 
p<.001). This association means that having a drug offense from initial prison conviction 
lends an offender to be significantly more likely to have their recidivism conviction be a 
drug offense. In fact, a drug offense from initial prison conviction indicates that a 
recidivist is 700.2% more likely to commit another drug offense. This finding shows that 
convicted drug offenders tend to be specialized in their offending patterns. This model 
took into consideration sociodemographics including age at release, sex, white status, and 
LSI-R score, but did not find any to be significantly associated with general drug 
recidivism. 
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Table 7: Logistic Regression Model for General Drug Recidivism  
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount 1.000 .00001 0.99 
Total Restitution Amount .9999 .00001 -0.79 
Initial Conviction    
Prior Drug 8.002 4.168 3.99*** 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release 1.008 .0221 0.38 
Sex 
(females as reference group) 
1.825 1.009 1.09 
White  
(non-whites as reference group) 
.8578 .4175 -0.32 
LSI-R Score .9728 .029 -0.93 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
As shown in Table 8 and Table 9 neither total sanction amount nor total 
restitution amount were significantly associated with general drug recidivism when the 
analysis was run individually for males and females. While the variables of interest were 
not significantly associated, having a drug offense from initial prison conviction was 
strongly associated with general drug recidivism for males (OR=12.198, SE=8.089, 
z=3.77, p<.001), but it was not significant for females. This association means that males 
are the main cause for the strong association in Table 5. In other words, having a drug 
offense from initial prison conviction lends a male offender to be significantly more 
likely to have their recidivism conviction be a drug offense, but not a female offender. In 
fact, a drug offense from initial prison conviction indicates that a male recidivist is 
1,119.8% more likely to commit another drug offense. This finding shows that male 
convicted drug offenders tend to be specialized in their offending patterns. This model 
took into consideration sociodemographics, but did not find any to be significantly 
associated with general drug recidivism when the analysis was ran individually for males 
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and females. However, white status was perfectly associated with general drug recidivism 
for females and was therefore dropped from the female model. 
Table 8: Logistic Regression Model for General Drug Recidivism for Males 
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount 1.000 .00001 .82 
Total Restitution Amount .9999 .00002 -0.38 
Initial Conviction    
Prior Drug 12.198 8.089 3.77*** 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release .9959 .0266 -0.15 
White 
(non-whites as reference group) 
.7987 .406 -0.44 
LSI-R Score .9794 .0325 -0.63 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
Table 9: Logistic Regression Model for General Drug Recidivism for Females 
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount 1.000 .00008 .5 
Total Restitution Amount .9999 .0002 -0.33 
Initial Conviction    
Prior Drug 1.974 2.092 .64 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release 1.049 .0458 1.09 
LSI-R Score .9363 .07 -0.88 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
 
As shown in Table 10 and Table 11 neither total sanction amount nor total 
restitution amount were significantly associated with drug possession recidivism or drug 
trafficking recidivism. While the variables of interest were not significantly associated, 
having a drug offense from initial prison conviction was significantly associated with 
drug possession recidivism (OR=6.538, SE=5.418 z=2.27, p<.05) and significantly 
45 
 
associated with trafficking recidivism (OR=13.08, SE=10.32, z=3.26, p<.001). In other 
words, having a drug offense from initial prison conviction lends an offender to be 
significantly more likely to have their recidivism conviction be a drug possession or 
trafficking offense. In fact, a drug offense from initial prison conviction indicates that a 
recidivist is 553.8% more likely to commit a drug possession offense or 1,208% more 
likely to commit a trafficking offense. This finding shows that convicted drug offenders 
tend to be specialized in their offending patterns. Both models took sociodemographics 
into consideration. In the drug possession recidivism model, LSI-R score became 
significant (OR=.9063, SE=.0438, z=-2.04, p<.05). Indicating that as LSI-R score 
increases by one point, offenders are 9.37% less likely to have their recidivism conviction 
be a drug possession conviction. In the trafficking model, no sociodemographic factors 
were significantly associated with trafficking recidivism. 
Table 10: Logistic Regression Model for Drug Possession Recidivism Subtype  
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount 1.000 .00002 0.90 
Total Restitution Amount .9999 .00003 -0.65 
Initial Conviction    
Prior Drug 6.538 5.418 2.27* 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release .9991 .0358 -0.03 
Sex 
(females as reference group) 
.7924 .8739 -0.21 
White 
(non-whites as reference group) 
1.256 1.055 0.27 
LSI-R Score .9063 .0438 -2.04* 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
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Table 11: Logistic Regression Model for Trafficking Recidivism Subtype 
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount 1.000 .00001 .57 
Total Restitution Amount .9999 .00002 -0.34 
Initial Conviction    
Prior Drug 13.08 10.32 3.26*** 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release 1.014 .0291 .47 
Sex 
(females as reference group) 
1.939 1.381 .93 
White 
(non-whites as reference group) 
.6576 .3982 -0.69 
LSI-R Score 1.006 .0396 .15 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
 
Logistic Regression Analysis for Property Recidivism 
As shown in Table 12, neither total sanction amount or total restitution amount 
were significantly associated with property recidivism. This model took 
sociodemographics into consideration including, age at release from prison or work 
release, sex, white status, and LSI-R score. None of the sociodemographic factors were 
found to be significant. 
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Table 12: Logistic Regression Model for General Property Recidivism  
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount 1.000 .00002 1.15 
Total Restitution Amount .9999 .00005 -0.82 
Initial Conviction    
Prior Property 1.246 1.118 .25 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release 1.002 .0381 .04 
Sex 
(females as reference group) 
1.119 1.238 .1 
White 
(non-whites as reference group) 
2.138 2.34 .69 
LSI-R Score .9654 .0499 -0.68 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
 
Individual logistic regression models for general property recidivism were 
computed for males and females. As shown in Table 13, neither total sanction amount nor 
total restitution amount were significantly associated with male general property 
recidivism. The model considered sociodemographic variables. For females, all 
socioeconomic variables were perfectly associated with general property recidivism and 
were therefore dropped from the models. Because of this, no model is shown. 
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Table 13: Logistic Regression Model for General Property Recidivism for Males 
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount 1.000 .0000 1.3 
Total Restitution Amount .9999 .0001 -.6 
Initial Conviction    
Prior Property 1.879 1.768 .67 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release 1.021 .0397 .55 
White 
(non-whites as reference group) 
1.902 2.107 .58 
LSI-R Score .9878 .0569 -.21 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
Burglary recidivism and theft recidivism were both similar to general property 
recidivism. As shown in Table 14 and Table 15, neither total sanction amount nor total 
restitution amount were significantly associated with burglary recidivism or theft 
recidivism. Both models considered sociodemographic variables. Having a property 
offense from initial prison conviction, sex, and white status were dropped from the 
burglary recidivism model because they were perfectly associated with burglary 
recidivism. 
Table 14: Logistic Regression Model for Burglary Recidivism Subtype 
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount 1.000 .00009 .89 
Total Restitution Amount .9998 .0003 -0.44 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release 1.163 .1318 1.33 
LSI-R Score 1.423 .5233 .96 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
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Table 15: Logistic Regression Model for Theft Recidivism Subtype 
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount 1.000 .00002 1.09 
Total Restitution Amount .9999 .00004 -0.76 
Initial Conviction    
Prior Property .5714 .6533 -0.49 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release .9789 .0429 -0.49 
Sex 
(females as reference group) 
1.578 1.782 .4 
White 
(non-whites as reference group) 
1.821 2.034 .54 
LSI-R Score .9416 .052 -1.09 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
 
Logistic Regression Analysis for Violent Recidivism 
As shown in Table 16, neither total sanction amount or total restitution amount 
were significantly associated with general violent recidivism. The model considered 
sociodemographic variables. Sex was dropped from the model because it was perfectly 
associated with general violent recidivism. 
Table 16: Logistic Regression Model for General Violent Recidivism 
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount 1.0000 .00002 .55 
Total Restitution Amount .9999 .00003 -0.07 
Initial Conviction    
Prior Violent .2721 .4204 -0.84 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release .856 .0795 -1.68 
White 
(non-whites as reference group) 
1.942 2.162 .6 
LSI-R Score 1.05 .0648 .79 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
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Individual logistic regression models for general violent recidivism were 
computed for males and females. As shown in Table 17, neither total sanction amount nor 
total restitution amount were significantly associated with male general violent 
recidivism. The model considered sociodemographic variables. For females, all variables 
were dropped from the model as there were not enough observations to accurately 
compute. Because of this, no model is shown. 
Table 17: Logistic Regression Model for General Violent Recidivism for Males 
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount 1.000 .00002 .55 
Total Restitution Amount .9999 .00003 -0.07 
Initial Conviction    
Prior Violent .2721 .4204 -0.84 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release .856 .0795 -1.68 
White 
(non-whites as reference group) 
1.942 2.162 .6 
LSI-R Score 1.05 .0648 .79 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
 
As shown in Table 18, neither total sanction amount nor total restitution amount 
were significantly associated with kidnap recidivism. The model took sociodemographic 
variables into consideration. Having a violent conviction from initial prison, sex, and 
white status were perfectly associated with kidnap recidivism and were therefore dropped 
from the model.  
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Table 18: Logistic Regression Model for Kidnap Recidivism Subtype 
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount 1.0000 .00005 .79 
Total Restitution Amount .9975 .0037 -0.69 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release 1.052 .162 .33 
LSI-R Score 3.241 4.915 .78 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
 
As shown in Table 19, neither total sanction amount nor total restitution amount 
were significantly associated with assault recidivism. The model took sociodemographic 
variables into consideration. Age at release from prison or work release (OR=.7786, 
SE=.1114, z=-1.75, p<.08) was significantly associated with assault recidivism. This 
indicates that as an offender ages, they are 22.14% less likely to have their recidivism 
conviction be an assault conviction. The sex variable was dropped from the model 
because it was perfectly associated with assault recidivism. 
Table 19: Logistic Regression Model for Assault Recidivism Subtype 
Variable OR SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount .9999 .00004 -0.18 
Total Restitution Amount 1.0000 .00005 .42 
Initial Conviction    
Prior Violent .3087 .4856 -0.75 
Sociodemographics    
Age at Release .7786 .1114 -1.75^ 
White 
(non-whites as reference group) 
1.545 1.767 .38 
LSI-R Score 1.006 .0637 .09 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ^p<.08 
Note: OR=Odds ratio; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
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ROC Curve Analysis for Drug Recidivism 
As shown in Table 20 and Figure 1, ROC curve analysis was computed on drug 
recidivism. In this analysis, total sanction amount (AUC=.6253, SE=.0538) and total 
restitution amount (AUC=.5436, SE=.0598) were found to be weakly, but better than 
random chance, associated with drug recidivism. 
Table 20: ROC Curve for Drug Recidivism 
Variable AUC1 SE 
Total Sanction Amount .6253 .0538 
Total Restitution Amount .5436 .0598 
1AUC: 0.5 indicates random chance, therefore, anything between 0.5 and 0.7 is weak; 
0.71-0.8 is moderate; 0.8 to 0.9 is strong; and 0.91 and above is best 
Note: AUC=Area under the curve; SE=Standard error 
 
 
 Figure 1: ROC Curve for Drug Recidivism 
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ROC Curve Analysis for Property Recidivism 
As shown in Table 21 and Figure 2, ROC curve analysis was computed on 
property recidivism. In this analysis, total sanction amount (AUC=.6929, SE=.078) was 
found to be weakly, but better than random chance, associated with drug recidivism and 
total restitution amount (AUC=.7219, SE=.0863) was found to be moderately associated 
with drug recidivism. 
Table 21: ROC Curve for Property Recidivism 
Variable AUC1 SE 
Total Sanction Amount .6929 .078 
Total Restitution Amount .7219 .0863 
1AUC: 0.5 indicates random chance, therefore, anything between 0.5 and 0.7 is weak; 
0.71-0.8 is moderate; 0.8 to 0.9 is strong; and 0.91 and above is best 
Note: AUC: Area under the curve; SE=Standard error 
 
 
 Figure 2: ROC Curve for Property Recidivism 
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ROC Curve Analysis for Violent Recidivism 
As shown in Table 22 and Figure 3, ROC curve analysis was computed on violent 
recidivism. In this analysis, total sanction amount (AUC=.7149, SE=.1155) was found to 
be moderately associated with drug recidivism and total restitution amount (AUC=.5735, 
SE=.1175) was found to be weakly, but better than random chance, associated with drug 
recidivism. 
Table 22: ROC Curve for Violent Recidivism 
Variable AUC1 SE 
Total Sanction Amount .7149 .1155 
Total Restitution Amount .5735 .1175 
1AUC: 0.5 indicates random chance, therefore, anything between 0.5 and 0.7 is weak; 
0.71-0.8 is moderate; 0.8 to 0.9 is strong; and 0.91 and above is best 
Note: AUC=Area under the curve; SE=Standard error 
 
 
 Figure 3: ROC Curve for Violent Recidivism 
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Negative Binomial Regression Analysis for Days to Recidivism 
As shown in Table 23, both total sanction amount (b=-.00001, z=-1.85, p<.065) 
and total restitution amount (b=.00001, z=2.32, p<.05) were significantly associated with 
days to recidivism. From these results, it can be determined that as total sanction amount 
increases, days to recidivism decreases. Furthermore, as total restitution amount 
increases, days to recidivism increases. According to this information, restitution may act 
as a protective factor, helping offenders stay out of prison longer. This model included 
sociodemographics and prior conviction types. Neither sex nor white status were 
significantly associated with days to recidivism, but having a violent offense from initial 
prison conviction was significantly associated with days to recidivism (b=-0.4539, z=-
2.00, p<.05). This indicates that having a violent offense from initial prison conviction 
makes an offender quicker to recidivate. 
Table 23: Negative Binomial Regression Model for Days to Recidivism 
Variable b SE Z 
Monetary Sanctions    
Total Sanction Amount -0.00001 5.91e-06 -1.85^ 
Total Restitution Amount .00001 6.41e-06 2.32* 
Sociodemographics    
Sex 
(females as reference group) 
.0441 .1732 .25 
White 
(non-whites as reference group) 
-0.0213 .1476 -0.14 
Prior Conviction    
Prior Drug .1659 .1984 .84 
Prior Property -0.2439 .2062 -1.18 
Prior Violent -0.4539 .2264 -2.00* 
n 138   
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ^p<.065 
Note: b= negative binomial regression coefficient; SE=Standard error; Z=z-score 
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Two-Sample T-Test Analyses for Monetary Sanctions 
 Tables 24 and 25 display two-sample t-tests for both types of monetary sanction 
amounts and the two legal representation options. In the total sanction amount model, 
there are group differences at the 0.05 significance level (t=-2.39; p=0.0169). In the total 
restitution amount model, there are group differences at the 0.05 significance level (t=-
2.46; p=0.0143). The results reveal that those individuals who qualified as indigent and 
retained a state appointed public defender, on average, had significantly less total 
sanction charge amount and less total restitution charge amount than those individuals 
who did not. 
Table 24: Two-Sample T-Test Model for Total Sanction Amount 
Variable N Mean SE SD 
Public Defender 693 $18122.34 1457.24 38361.69 
Private Attorney 36 $34609.89 11344.19 68065.17 
 
 
Table 25: Two-Sample T-Test Model for Total Restitution Amount 
Variable N Mean SE SD 
Public Defender 692 $5401.24 1308.75 34427.71 
Private Attorney 36 $20858.01 11437.21 68623.27 
 
 
 
Two-Sample T-Test Analyses for LSI-R Score 
Table 26 displays a two-sample t-test for LSI-R score and the two legal 
representation options. There are group differences at the 0.01 significance level (t=5.45; 
p=0.000). The results revealed that those individuals who qualified as indigent and 
retained a state appointed public defender, on average, had significantly higher LSI-R 
scores than those individuals who did not. 
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Table 26: Two-Sample T-Test Model for LSI-R Score 
Variable N Mean SE SD 
Public Defender 669 30.53 .286 7.398 
Private Attorney 36 23.639 1.191 7.144 
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CHAPTER V 
 DISCUSSION 
 
Format of Discussion 
 The discussion chapter is divided into the following format. The results of the 
drug recidivism models are discussed followed by a discussion of the property recidivism 
and violent recidivism models. Each hypothesis is discussed in relation to the outcomes 
derived for the respective models. Similar to the results section formatting, each batch of 
models is prefaced using a heading indicating which type of recidivism is being 
discussed. Finally, the additional data analysis models are discussed in relation to the 
outcomes derived for the respective models.  
 
Variable Significance and Hypothesis - Drug Recidivism Models 
 Examination of the logistic models according to the first hypothesis which states, 
as total court-ordered monetary sanction amount increases, the reported instances of 
return to prison will increase, is not supported by the data in this analysis. Examination of 
the models according to the second hypothesis which states, as total court-ordered 
restitution amount increases, the reported instances of return to prison will decrease, is 
not supported by the data in this analysis. Examination of the models according to the 
third hypothesis which states, the total court-ordered monetary sanction amounts predict 
above and beyond known predictors (i.e. age, sex, race, criminal history, SES) of 
recidivism with regard to reported instances of return to prison, is not supported by the 
data in this analysis.  
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 While prior research has shown that monetary sanctions act as a financial barrier, 
charting a path back to a criminal lifestyle and prison conviction (Maruna 2001; Diller et 
al. 2010; Harris et al. 2010; Zimmer 2013), the covariate total sanction amount did not 
produce any significant recidivism outcomes among offenders in this analysis. According 
to theory, restitution can be an effective rehabilitative device (Eglash 1958; Jacob 1970). 
However, the covariate total restitution amount did not produce any significant 
recidivism outcomes among offenders in this analysis. 
 The data show that offenders, whose most serious offense from their initial prison 
conviction was a drug offense, are likely to recidivate with another drug offense. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of the National Council on Alcoholism and Drug 
Dependence, Inc. (2015) who found “approximately 95% of inmates return to alcohol and 
drug use after release from prison, and 60-80% of drug abusers commit a new crime 
(typically a drug-drive crime) after release from prison.” Additionally, Chandler, 
Fletcher, and Volkow (2009) suggest many drug-addicted individuals rapidly return to 
drug use following long periods of abstinence during incarceration. From a strain theory 
perspective, Botchkovar et al. (2013) suggest that prior coping history has some effect on 
subsequent coping choices. Furthermore, analysis showed that drug recidivism due to a 
drug offense from initial prison conviction is only significant for male offenders.  
Additionally, analysis showed drug offenders are significantly likely to have their 
recidivism conviction be a drug possession offense; this likelihood doubles for a 
trafficking offense. This is consistent with research by Langan and Levin (2002), who 
found a higher percentage of drug offenders returned to prison on trafficking charges. As 
the literature notes, crime is frequently used to get money quickly (Agnew et al. 1996; 
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Cernkovich et al. 2000; Colvin 2000). Therefore, from a strain theory perspective, 
individuals are trafficking drugs to reduce the strain brought on by failure to achieve 
monetary goals (i.e. pay back monetary sanction and live a conventional lifestyle).  
 No sociodemographic variables were found to be significantly associated with 
general drug recidivism or trafficking recidivism. LSI-R score was the only 
sociodemographic variable found to be significantly associated with drug possession 
recidivism. Indicating offenders with lower LSI-R scores are significantly more likely to 
recidivate with a drug possession offense than offenders with higher LSI-R scores.  
Examination of the ROC curve for drug recidivism shows that total court-ordered 
monetary sanction amount and total restitution amount are weakly, but better than 
random chance, associated with drug recidivism. 
 In summary, logistic regression analysis revealed monetary sanction amounts 
have null effects on drug recidivism. However, ROC curve analysis revealed total 
sanction amount and total restitution amount are weakly associated with drug recidivism. 
Logistic regression results showed offenders were more likely to recidivate with a drug 
offense if they were sentenced to prison on a drug conviction and if they were male. In 
addition, offenders were more likely to recidivate with a drug trafficking offense than a 
drug possession offense, although both were significantly linked to prior drug offending. 
Lastly, lower LSI-R scores were significantly associated with drug possession recidivism.  
 
Variable Significance and Hypothesis - Property Recidivism Models 
Examination of the logistic models according to the first hypothesis, which states, 
as total court-ordered monetary sanction amount increases, the reported instances of 
return to prison will increase, is not supported by the data in this analysis. Examination of 
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the models according to the second hypothesis, which states, as total court-ordered 
restitution amount increases, the reported instances of return to prison will decrease, is 
not supported by the data in this analysis. Examination of the models according to the 
third hypothesis which states, the total court-ordered monetary sanction amounts predict 
above and beyond known predictors (i.e. age, sex, race, criminal history, SES) of 
recidivism with regard to reported instances of resentence to prison, is not supported by 
the data in this analysis.  
Neither having a property offense from initial prison conviction nor 
sociodemographic variables were found to be significant in this analysis. This finding is 
inconsistent with previous research concluding there is specialization in offending 
behaviors amongst property offenders. The U.S. Department of Justice (2016) found a 
higher percentage of released property offenders were arrested for a property crime 
(54%) than any other offender. From a strain theory perspective, this finding is also 
inconsistent because, as previously mentioned crime is frequently used to get money 
quickly to reduce strain (Agnew et al. 1996; Cernkovich et al. 2000; Colvin 2000). 
Property offenses are a quick way to make money for monetary sanctions and other life 
necessities. 
Examination of the ROC curve for property recidivism shows that total court-
ordered monetary sanction amount is weakly associated with property recidivism and 
total restitution is moderately associated with property recidivism. 
 In summary, logistic regression analysis revealed monetary sanction amounts 
have null effects on property recidivism. However, ROC curve analysis revealed total 
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sanction amount is weakly associated with property recidivism and total restitution 
amount is moderately associated with property recidivism.  
 
Variable Significance and Hypothesis - Violent Recidivism Models 
Examination of the logistic models according to the first hypothesis, which states, 
as total court-ordered monetary sanction amount increases, the reported instances of 
return to prison will increase, is not supported by the data in this analysis. Examination of 
the models according to the second hypothesis, which states, as total court-ordered 
restitution amount increases, the reported instances of return to prison will decrease, is 
not supported by the data in this analysis. Examination of the models according to the 
third hypothesis which states, the total court-ordered monetary sanction amounts predict 
above and beyond known predictors (i.e. age, sex, race, criminal history, SES) of 
recidivism with regard to reported instances of resentence to prison, is not supported by 
the data in this analysis.  
The data from the logistic models show that age is significantly associated with 
assault recidivism. As an offender ages, they are less likely to return to prison on an 
assault charge. It is well known as offenders age, they are less likely to reoffend (Langan 
and Levin 2002; May et al. 2008; Iowa Department of Corrections 2016). Additionally, 
young people age 16-24 have the highest violent crime rates (U.S. Department of Justice 
1994). From a strain theory perspective, Anderson (1999) argued that young males are 
under much pressure to respond to one type of strain—disrespectful treatment— with 
violence. As young people age, they begin to have more control over the nature of their 
social world and develop positive social connections of their own choosing (Agnew 
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1997). In this sense, as offenders age, they can cope with strains without returning to 
violence. 
Besides age, no other sociodemographic variables were found to be significant in 
this analysis. Having a violent offense from initial prison conviction was also not found 
to be significantly associated with violent recidivism. This is inconsistent with previous 
research concluding there is specialization in offending behaviors amongst violent 
offenders. The U.S. Department of Justice (2016) found a higher percentage of released 
violent offenders were arrested for a violent crime (33.1%) than any other offender. 
Furthermore, among prisoners released for assault, approximately 34.4 percent were 
rearrested for assault (U.S. Department of Justice 2016). 
Examination of the ROC curve for violent recidivism shows that total sanction 
amount is moderately associated with violent recidivism and total restitution amount is 
weakly, but better than random chance, associated with violent recidivism. 
In summary, logistic regression analysis revealed monetary sanction amounts 
have null effects on violent recidivism. However, ROC curve analysis revealed total 
sanction amount is moderately associated with violent recidivism and total restitution 
amount is weakly associated with violent recidivism. Logistic regression results showed 
younger offenders more likely to recidivate with an assault conviction than older 
offenders.  
 
Additional Data Analysis - Days to Recidivism Model 
 Additional data analysis was run on the studies primary covariates, total sanction 
amount and total restitution amount, to see if a significant association exists with days to 
failure (recidivism). Examination of the negative binomial regression model revealed 
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both to be significant associations. From the results, it can be determined individuals with 
higher amounts of monetary sanctions recidivate sooner than individuals with lower 
amounts of monetary sanctions. Indicating court-ordered monetary sanctions interact with 
recidivism in some fashion. Furthermore, it can be determined individuals with higher 
amounts of total restitution recidivate later than individuals with lower amounts of 
restitution. According to this information, restitution may act as a protective factor, 
helping offenders stay out of prison longer.  Indicating court-ordered restitution interacts 
with the restorative justice philosophy in some fashion. Perhaps where the monetary 
sanction money goes to (i.e. the government versus victim) has some effect on 
recidivism. 
This model also included sociodemographics and prior conviction types. No 
sociodemographic variables were found to be significantly associated. Having a violent 
offense from initial prison conviction was the only prior significantly associated with 
days to recidivism. Indicating that individuals entering prison on a violent offense 
recidivate quicker than individuals who did not. This is inconsistent with data reported by 
the U.S. Department of Justice (2014) who found after six months, property offenders 
were most likely to return to prison (21.8%), followed by violent offenders (16.2%), and 
then drug offenders (15.4%); after one year property offenders were most likely to return 
to prison (36.4%), followed by drug offenders (28.1%), and then violent offenders 
(27.5%). This order continued through year five. 
In summary, higher amounts of total monetary sanctions shorten time to 
recidivism while higher amounts of total restitution lengthen time to recidivism. By 
lengthening the time to recidivism, restitution acts as a protective factor for offenders. 
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The data also concluded, offenders entering prison on a violent offense recidivate quicker 
after release than those who entered prison on a drug or property offense. 
 
Additional Data Analysis – Monetary Sanction and LSI-R Two-Sample T-Test 
Models 
Additional data analysis was run on the studies primary covariates, total sanction 
amount and total restitution amount, and LSI-R score to see if a significant association 
exists with these variables and SES (determined by whether a defendant retained a public 
defender). Examination of two-sample t-test models revealed significant group 
differences in all three models.  
Individuals who qualified for and retained a public defender, on average, had both 
significantly less total sanction amounts and significantly less total restitution amounts. 
Per this information, the public defenders in this sample achieved more favorable 
outcomes for offenders than private attorneys. The literature on attorney effectiveness is 
mixed. A large portion of research indicates public defenders do as well as privately 
retained attorneys in gaining favorable outcomes for defendants (Hanson, Ostrom, 
Hewitt, and Lomvardias 1992; Cohen 2014). Other research finds private attorneys 
achieve better outcomes than public defenders (Hoffman, Rubin, and Shepherd 2005). 
According to Hanson et al. (1992:103-4), “…in instances where the type of attorney does 
have an effect on these rates, the impact is very weak and not always in a more favorable 
direction toward the defendants represented by privately retained counsel.”  
A possible explanation for the finding in this study is that public defenders have 
an immense workload and therefore may have more experience than a private attorney, 
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giving them an upper hand on reducing monetary sanction amounts. An alternative 
explanation could be that judges do take into consideration the offenders’ socioeconomic 
status and sentence indigent individuals with lower amounts of monetary sanctions. 
The third model showed indigent individuals who qualified for and retained a 
public defender, on average, had significantly higher LSI-R scores. The LSI-R has 10 
scales to determine risk/need score. One is Financial Situation (financial stability and 
problems). A study conducted by Manchak, Skeem, Douglas, and Siranosian (2009) 
found the financial scale of the LSI-R significantly predicted risk of general recidivism 
for both men and women. Additionally, research shows that such factors as employment 
problems, poverty, and low socioeconomic status are important contributors to crime 
(Valdez, Kaplan, and Curtis 2007). These findings contribute to the current study by 
concurring that offenders with high financial instability (i.e. individuals who quality for a 
public defender), have higher LSI-R scores and higher recidivism rates. 
In summary, two-sample t-test models revealed that offenders who qualified as 
indigent under Iowa Code and retained a public defender had higher LSI-R scores, less 
total sanction amounts, and less total restitution amounts, than offenders who retained a 
private attorney. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis examined data from the Iowa Department of Corrections and Iowa 
Courts Online. The data were collected in the state of Iowa in the United States and 
consisted of 729 first-time prisoners; 635 males and 94 females. The aim of this thesis 
was to test the basic premise of general strain theory (Agnew 1992) as applied to court-
ordered monetary sanctions. This thesis used logistic regression analysis, ROC curve 
analysis, negative binomial regression analysis, and two-sample t-test analysis to 
determine if total sanction amount increases the likelihood of recidivism and if total 
restitution amount decreases the likelihood of recidivism after first-time prisoners are 
released from a term of incarceration. Recidivism was defined as a return to prison over a 
three-year period following release. The number of offenders who have established 
criminal histories shows that many offenders reoffend despite contact with the criminal 
justice system. The statistical significance of court-ordered monetary sanction amounts 
not being statistically significant suggests that the current practice of deterrence is 
ineffective, as the threat of punishment (monetary sanctions) does not seem to deter 
offenders from repeating their criminal ways. 
 In summary, while criminal defendants are overwhelmingly poor, the findings 
related to the research hypotheses from this thesis show some association, but are not 
overwhelmingly supported. Logistic regression analysis showed neither total sanction 
amount nor total restitution amount to be significantly associated with drug, property, or 
violent recidivism defined as a return to prison over a three-year time span. However, 
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ROC curve analyses found total sanction amount to be weakly associated with drug 
recidivism and moderately associated with both property and violent recidivism. 
Furthermore, ROC curve analyses found total restitution amount to be weakly associated 
with both drug recidivism and violent recidivism and moderately associated with 
property recidivism. Lastly, Negative binomial regression concluded higher amounts of 
total monetary sanctions shorten time to recidivism while higher amounts of total 
restitution lengthen time to recidivism. These findings suggest some association exists 
between recidivism and monetary sanctions.  
Further logistic analysis revealed offenders were more likely to recidivate with a 
drug offense if they were sentenced to prison on a drug conviction and if they were male. 
In addition, offenders whose initial prison conviction included a drug offense were more 
likely to recidivate with a drug trafficking offense than a drug possession offense, 
although both were significantly linked to prior drug offending. The offenders 
recidivating with a drug possession offense were likely to have lower LSI-R scores. 
Logistic regression also showed offenders recidivating with an assault offense were likely 
to be younger in age; negative binomial regression showed offenders entering prison on a 
violent offense recidivate quicker after release than those who entered prison on a drug or 
property offense conviction. Two-sample t-test models revealed that offenders who 
qualify as indigent under Iowa Code and retained a public defender had higher LSI-R 
scores, less total sanction amounts, and less total restitution amounts, than offenders who 
retained a private attorney. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
 As indicated, the results from this analysis were derived from data collected 
throughout Iowa in the United States on a sample of male and female offenders who were 
first-time prisoners. Provided the diversity of offense classification, the results of this 
analysis can be generalized across offender type. While women were slightly 
overrepresented, the results from this analysis can be generalized across Iowa. However, 
the results cannot be generalized across geographic areas because Iowa does not have an 
offender population that matches large urban areas. Future research should examine 
effects using a more diverse sample population collected across multiple states in the 
United States. Furthermore, results from this analysis cannot be generalized beyond the 
criteria which classified an offender as a first-time prisoner. Future research should 
examine effects, both restrictive to Iowa and across multiple states, using a broader 
population. 
 Additional limitations likely exist due to the inability to gather country-wide data 
and court expungements. During the three-year tracking period, it is probable some 
offenders were imprisoned in another state. Analyzing a national dataset would 
counteract this limitation. It is also probable some offenders have expunged cases beyond 
their initial prison conviction cases. These cases have been sealed, or erased in the eyes 
of the law, therefore making the records and court-ordered monetary sanction information 
unavailable. Cases are not allowed to be expunged before full payment, but some 
defendants may have fully paid off a case, thus allowing the expungement and restricting 
monetary sanction amounts from being included in analysis (Iowa Code, Chapter 901C, 
Section 2; Iowa Code, Chapter 907, Section 9).  
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 Future research should expand upon how court-ordered monetary sanctions affect 
days to failure (recidivism) by fleshing out the differences between who pays and who 
does not pay their court-ordered monetary sanctions. Future research should analyze the 
days to recidivism rates between these two groups, specifically focusing on restitution, as 
restitution may be the key to lowering recidivism. Qualitative interviews could be useful 
in figuring out if where the monetary sanction money goes to (i.e. the government or 
victims) really does matter to offenders, or if some other component is allowing a 
restorative factor to be seen with restitution. Examining data and using this level of detail 
will allow for further examination of the restorative justice punishment philosophy. 
Lastly, future research should more intensely examine socio-cultural factors, 
especially race and ethnicity. Specifically, it would be interesting to group offenders by 
racial categories who commit stereotype congruent crimes compared to those who do not 
in order to determine if there are differences in court-ordered monetary sanction amounts 
and recidivism outcomes. Research by Harris et al. (2011) suggests that defendants who 
commit stereotype congruent offense receive more severe monetary sanctions.  
 
Future Implications 
Though the results do not highlight any particularly significant effect of total 
court-ordered monetary sanction amounts on increasing or reducing recidivism, 
significant effects of total court-ordered monetary sanction amounts on days to 
recidivism were found. This research adds to the growing body of knowledge on the topic 
of criminal recidivism and shows that court-ordered monetary sanction amount is a 
potentially significant factor when it comes to recidivism and time to failure. No one 
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factor is solely a predictor of potential recidivism for offenders; it is a combination of 
variables that increases the risk they pose to reoffend when released from prison. Further 
investigation of the link these factors share would benefit legislators, all personnel in the 
criminal justice system, and the community. Additionally, perhaps restorative justice 
criminologists are onto something and further investigation of court-ordered restitution’s 
protective factor could help reduce recidivism, bettering the lives of those persons who 
were incarcerated instead of solely reducing the time to recidivate. 
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